Investigating the relationship between CEO compensation and firm diversification over 1985-1990, we 
Introduction
• Determining the set of activities a firm will undertake is one of the fundamental problems faced by its top management. Managers make this decision in the context of considerable controversy over the relationship between firm performance and firm diversification. A wave of conglomerate mergers during the 1960s dramatically increased the diversification of the largest U.S. firms (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) as corporate managers apparently embraced the view that diversification added value. There is some evidence of a modest decline in diversification over the 1980s (Comment and Jarrell, 1995) , as the market appeared to change its assessment of diversification. Stock market event studies of mergers and acquisitions suggest positive market reactions to diversifying activity in the 1960s, but much less favorable responses in the 1980s (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Matsusaka, 1993) . Coincident with these trends, the managerial literature has shifted from touting the virtues of diversification as a source of value in the 1970s to a more sober analysis of ways to manage the diversified firm in the 1980s. Observing that the gains from constructing and managing corporate portfolios anticipated in the 1960s and early 1970s have failed to meet expectations, the managerial literature now advises diversification that clearly exploits synergies with existing businesses (Porter, 1987; CoUis and Montgomery, 1995) .
Despite the attention paid to diversification as a corporate strategy, the relationship between decisions on firm boundaries and the compensation of the firm's top managers has remained relatively unexplored. If the scope of the firm affects the challenge and complexity of the managerial task, as implied by the strategic management literature, compensation packages designed to attract and retain appropriate managerial talent should vary with the extent of diversification. An argument of this sort has been made in prior theoretical and empirical research on the effect of firm size on executive compensation: as revenues increase, both the size and the character of the compensation package change (Rosen, 1982 and 1992) . This article explores the empirical relationship between the scope of the firm-the extent to which it engages^ in a diverse set of businesses-and the compensation of its chief executive.
We begin, in Section 2, by measuring the empirical association of diversification and CEO pay for a panel of 473 CEOs over [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . These results, which are dominated by interfirm variation, suggest economically and statistically significant diversification premia in CEO compensation during the late 1980s. Firms with two lines of business pay on average 12% more in salary and bonus and 14% more in total compensation than do similar but undiversified firms.
We next attempt to interpret these premia. Section 3 describes two divergent classes of explanation. The first emphasizes the difficulty of managing diversified enterprises and the problem of matching the ability of the top manager to the characteristics of the firm. The second emphasizes agency problems, specifically that entrenched senior managers may use their position to increase diversification and their own compensation contrary to shareholder interests. We refer to the first type of argument as an "ability-matching" explanation and to the second set of arguments as "entrenchment" explanations. Both are consistent with the observed cross-sectional premium for diversification but, we argue, differ in the effects they predict for changes in the diversification premium over a CEO's tenure or consequent to changes in diversification undertaken by an incumbent CEO. The ability-matching argument predicts that the premium for new and experienced CEOs will be approximately equal, while the entrenchment arguments suggest that the premium will be greater for experienced CEOs. The ability-matching argument also predicts that the premium earned by an incumbent CEO who has diversified the firm will be lower than the premium earned by a CEO hired to manage an already diversified firm. In contrast, entrenchment arguments predict that the premium will be higher for the diversifying manager than for the manager hired by an already diversified firm.
Based on this argument, we attempt to distinguish empirically between abilitymatching and entrenchment models in Section 4. We report estimated diversification premia for a sample of 175 new CEOs that are roughly equal to the premia earned by our panel of "experienced" CEOs who have been incumbents for an average of eleven years. In first-difference specifications that isolate the response of compensation to changes in diversification initiated by incumbent CEOs, we find a penalty for increasing diversification. These pattems appear to be more consistent with the view that diversification premia in the 1980s were paid to attract and retain managers of sufficient ability than with the view that manipulating the firm's scope was an effective way for incumbent managers to increase their compensation. The implications of these results are discussed in Section 5.
Establishing the link between diversification and compensation

•
We explore the effects of diversification on CEO compensation by embedding a measure of diversification in a standard empirical model of executive compensation (see Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993) . In this model, compensation is a function of firm characteristics such as size and financial performance; CEO characteristics such as age and tenure; industry norms; and economywide or sectoral shifts in managerial compensation.
• Data. The data on CEO compensation and characteristics come from Forbes''s annual CEO compensation survey, 1985 CEO compensation survey, -1990 .' Information on firm characteristics are from Standard and Poor's Annual and Industry Segment COMPUSTAT files and the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) retums files. We delete firms in financial services or regulated industries, leaving a panel of 1,830 CEO-years.^ Because our empirical model includes lagged firm-performance measures, our estimates are based on a sample of CEOs with three or more years of tenure in the CEO position. We refer to these as "experienced" CEOs. The experienced-CEO dataset has 1,493 observations on 473 CEOs in 397 firms. Table 1 reports summary statistics for this panel in columns 1 through 3.
o Compensation measures. We use two measures of CEO compensation. The first is salary and bonus iSALARY), whether current or deferred. This component of compensation is relatively well defined and consistently measured across firms and over time for our sample period. The second, total compensation iTOTAL), is the most inclusive measure of compensation reported by Forbes. It includes benefits, long-term and contingent compensation, and net gains from the exercise of stock options, stock appreciation rights, and stock accrual rights (collectively referred to below as "options"). TOTAL mismeasures current compensation for two reasons. First, it understates current compensation in years that CEOs receive substantial options grants; the ex ante value of options is not recorded as compensation. Second, it overstates current compensation in years that options are exercised, when the entire ex post gain is attributed to current compensation. It is, however, the best measure of total compensation in our dataset.T he mean real SALARY in our sample is $1.1 million; mean TOTAL compensation is $1.9 million (see Table 1 , column 1).'* CEOs at undiversified firms (column 2) eam slightly lower average salaries and total compensation than their counterparts at diversified firms (column 3).'
• Firm characteristics. We identify three firm characteristics as potentially important determinants of executive compensation levels: diversification, size, and financial perfonnance. ' The time span of the data is due primarily to the version of the COMPUSTAT Industry Segment File available to us.
We delete regulated firms (including electric and gas utilities, gas pipelines, and telephone service) based on their COMPUSTAT primary industry assignment. We exclude these industries due to incomparable firm data and differences in their compensation level and structure (see Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993) .
Neither Forbes nor proxy statements during our sample period provide sufficient information on options awards to support a more sophisticated treatment, even if one could solve the valuation problem for unexercised options.
• * Dollar amounts all are inflated to 1990 constant dollars using the implicit GNP deflator. ' The means of ln(SALARY) and ln(TOTAL) are statistically different between the diversified and undiversified subsamples (at the .0001 level), although the means of the raw variables are not statistically distinguishable at conventional levels of significance. Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All dollar amounts are inflated to 1990 constant dollars using the implicit GNP deflator.
Diversification. Data on a firm's major business activities are reported in the business segment section of the Securities and Exchange Commission 10-K reports beginning in 1977. The 1976 Financial Accounting Standards Board standard (SFAS No. 14) for reporting these data allows firms considerable latitude in defining business segments. The standard notes the weaknesses of common classification schemes (e.g., SIC codes), but it encourages firms to identify those businesses operating in distinct product markets as segments. Once segments are defined, companies are required to report segment data for all segments contributing at least 10% of the firm's revenue. No firm, therefore, is required to report data on more than ten segments.
We obtain business-segment data from COMPUSTAT's Industry Segment Files, which record seven years of segment data for each covered company. COMPUSTAT assigns a primary four-digit SIC code to each reported segment and records revenues for most reported segments. We use these data to construct two indices of firm diversification.* ' We experimented with a measure that would be sensitive to the "distance" between segments (similar The simplest diversification measure is a count of the number of unique four-digit SIC code segments reported for each year iNUMSEG). The index weights all segments equally. Distributions of firms and observations over NUMSEG are described in Table  2 . Approximately one-third of our observations are for firms reporting only one segment; multisegment firms report 3.4 segments on average.^ Interestingly, some firms report data on segments with sales less than 10% of company sales, suggesting that firms may choose to report segments they wish to emphasize to stockholders and analysts, even if these are below the formal' threshold.
A more complex diversification index, DTVERSE, incorporates information on the size distribution of segments. DIVERSE is defined as NUMSEG DTVERSE = 1 -segment sales j company sales where segment sales are the sales reported for the business segment and company sales is the sum of segment sales for the firm. This measure, which is one minus a Herfindahl index for the firm's business segments, increases (nonlinearly) with the number of segments, holding constant the variance of segment size, and declines with the variance of segment shares, holding constant the number of segments.* Thus, a firm with two equal-sized segments is ranked as more diversified than a firm with two unequal segments. Because the index is sensitive to the variance in shares, it allows the data to reveal compensation differentials that reflect the size distribution of shares. This will be important, for example, if a firm with two equal-sized segments requires greater m£inagerial inputs than does a two-segment firm in which there is a clear "primary" segment (e.g., 75% or more of sales). By construction, DTVERSE has a lower bound of zero (for single-segment firms) and an upper bound of .90 (for a ten-segment firm with 10% of sales in each segment). The sample mean for DIVERSE is .32, and the mean for firms with multiple segments is .48. Because it is sensitive to both the number and size distribution of business segments, our initial analysis focuses on DIVERSE.
Firm size. Measures of firm scale are included to account for the well-documented relationship between compensation and firm size.' Most studies measure scale by total company revenues iSALES); we also consider controlling for the number of employees iEMPLOY). These two measures are highly correlated, and as the data reported in Table 1 show, the firms in our sample are quite large in both dimensions. Annual revenues average over $6 billion in constant 1990 dollars, and the average firm has 40,000 employees. Diversified firms are larger on average than undiversified firms for both scale measures.'" in spirit to GoUop and Monahan (1991) ). We measured the distance between each pair of segments by the probability of observing it within a single firm in the universe of business-segment data. Because most of the probabilities were quite small, this measure added no explanatory power.
' The number of reported segments declines slightly over time, from a mean of 2.79 in 1985 to a mean of 2.48 in 1990, across all firms in our sample. This decUne may reflect both a decUne in firm diversification and a change in reporting behavior (see Lichtenberg, 1991) .
' Similar measures have been used in a few earUer studies of diversification; see Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) , Goliop and Monahan (1991) , and Comment and JarreU (1995) .
' This relation is one of the most robust empirical regularities in the literature on top executive pay. Formal ability-matching models, beginning with Rosen (1982) , have been motivated in part by a desire to explain it. Others (e.g.. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988) have argued that the relationship is an artifact of rule-of-thumb heuristics, popularized by compensation consultants, for determining CEO pay.
'" All noted differences in raw means between the diversified and undiversified subsamples are significant at the .01 level or better, unless otherwise noted. These are based on Ntests of the means across the two subsamples, assuming unequal variances in the two subsamples. For sales, the difference is significant at the .09 level if measured by SALES and at the .0001 level if measured by ln(SALES). Firm financial performance. While the theoretical and empirical hterature suggest a positive correlation hetween firm financial performance and CEO pay, there is little consensus on the functional form of the relationship or the correct measures of profitability. Fortunately, our empirical analysis suggests that the diversification estimates are relatively rohust to how we control for performance.
We consider two measures of firm profitability: the stock market rate of retum on common equity iMKTROR) and the accounting rate of retum on book equity iACC-ROR). Despite the similarity in overall mean retums (.18 for market and .15 for accounting), the correlation between these variables is only .25. Although we report results from several perfonnance specifications, the data appear to prefer a specification that includes current and lagged market and accounting retums in the determination of CEO compensation. Following Joskow and Rose (1994) , we include one-and two-year lags in the retum measures. This implies that we can estimate the full model only for "experienced" CEOs, i.e., those who have held the office for three or more years.
The full retum specification includes a measure of stock price volatility to control for differences in compensation due to differential riskiness of firms' profit streams. Lower retum variance may lessen the probability of large negative retums that could lead a board to replace a CEO (Amihud and Lev, 1981) or lead to bankruptcy that terminates employment (Rose, 1992) . If the compensation scheme includes an "insurance" component that refiects risk-return tradeoffs, compensation should fall with reduced variance." Financial risk is indexed by the standard deviation of the firm's weekly stock market retum over the fiscal year, SDRET.
" The expected value of contingent compensation may increase with retum variability: ex ante option value rises with variance. If options are a substantial portion of a CEO's compensation, this may imply an offsetting decrease in the fixed SALARY component despite constant or higher TOTAL compensation. We do not have the data to test this conjecture, but the positive correlation between retum variance and SALARY in our data suggests it does not dominate.
Consistent with some previous research (e.g., Montgomery and Wemerfelt, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994) , average profitability is higher at the undiversified firms in our sample. The average market retum is five percentage points higher at undiversified firms (22% versus 17% for diversified firms); the average accounting return is two percentage points higher for these firms (16% versus 14% for diversified firms). The higher mean retums at undiversified firms are associated with higher retum variance. SDRET averages 4.6 percentage points for undiversified firms, compared to 4.1 percentage points for diversified firms.
While our specification controls for the firm characteristics commonly included in compensation studies, we do not have the data to control for ownership concentration. A firm with a large stockholder might have a different compensation profile for its top managers. If the CEO holds a large block of company stock, her observed compensation might be affected by the stockholding. In particular, the higher tax rate for income relative to capital gains might lead a CEO to prefer more stock to higher compensation. This is offered as one explanation for the commonly observed phenomenon of lower compensation for founders in prior studies. Although we control for the founder effect (see below), we cannot control for ownership concentration. This will affect our estimated diversification coefficient only if concentration is systematically related to diversification (controlling for firm size) and is correlated with compensation levels.
• CEO characteristics. Prior work suggests that CEO age, tenure, and background may have significant effects on compensation levels. We use Forbes data to construct variables recording the chief executive's age when appointed CEO iAGE), years of tenure as a CEO iCEOTEN), a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was hired from outside the firm iOUTSIDE), and a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was the firm's founder iFOUNDER).^^ The founder variable is included because prior studies have found that founders' compensation packages are systematically different from those of nonfounders.
There are notable differences in the distributions of CEO characteristics between diversified and undiversified firms. While most CEOs are promoted from within the firm, diversified firms are even less likely to hire outsiders than are undiversified firms (13% versus 18%).'^ Diversified firms' CEOs are on average four years older when they assume the CEO position than are those at undiversified firms. Perhaps because of this age difference, CEOs at diversified firms also have a shorter average tenure as CEOs (10.5 years versus 12.8 years for undiversified firms).''* There are few founders in the sample, but the probability that the CEO is a founder is substantially larger for single-segment firms. This may refiect more specialized expertise, a greater commitment to the original line of business by founding CEOs, or differences in firm age.
• Industry and time effects. CEO compensation is strongly infiuenced by industry norms and economywide movements in executive pay (see Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993) . We introduce year fixed effects (S,) to control for aggregate shifts in real compensation levels over time. To accommodate differences in mean compensation levels across industries, we first classify similar two-digit SIC code industries into "industry groups" (see Appendix Table Al for the classification scheme). We then calculate the '^ OUTSIDE is set equal to one for a CEO who was employed by the firm fewer than four years before appointment as CEO and who was not the firm's founder. The results are not particularly sensitive to the four-year cutoff.
' 5 Significantly different at the .02 level. ' •* Recall that these means are conditional on the CEO having three or more years of tenure, which is a criterion for inclusion in the experienced-CEO panel.
share of the firm's revenues derived from each industry group for which it reports business segment sales in that year. The fixed effect for each observation is the weighted average of effects for each industry group, using these revenue shares as weights:"
where SHARE^j, is the proportion of sales firm j has attributed to business segments in industry group k in year t, and a^ is the industry fixed effect for a firm operating only in industry it.
• Econometric specification. Eor the full panel of experienced CEOs we estimate the following basic compensation equation:
where i denotes the CEO, j denotes the firm, and t denotes the year. RETURN is a vector of firm performance measures iACCROR, MKTROR, and lags of these variables); J83 is the corresponding parameter vector. This specification assumes a constant elasticity of compensation with respect to firm size, consistent with most previous studies. DIVERSE, CEO tenure, age at appointment, and financial perfonnance are all assumed to have a constant proportional impact on compensation. OUTSIDE, FOUND-ER, WTGROUP, and year effects (5,) shift the compensation curve up or down. The reported regressions adjust the standard error estimates for heteroskedasticity and within-CEO correlation in the error. By,.
As we argue in Section 3, the ability-matching explanation and some versions of the entrenchment explanation imply that this error, e,^,, contains a CEO effect that is correlated with both diversification and compensation. In the case of ability models, this CEO effect ("unobserved ability") is what drives the predicted positive crosssectional correlation. Entrenchment effects ("CEO power") play a similar role in some entrenchment explanations. The first-difference specifications we use to explore the cross-sectional premia can be thought of as implicitly conditioning on (or removing) the CEO-specific component of the error. Because the implications of this conditioning vary across the ability-matching and entrenchment explanations, the data have power to distinguish empirically between these two explanations in a first-difference specification.
•
Estimates of the diversification premium. Table 3 reports parameter estimates for variants of the compensation equation using our panel dataset of 1,493 experienced CEO-years. In specifications reported here and in the broad range of altemative specifications we have explored, CEO compensation increases with the level of diversification reported by the firm. This effect is both statistically and economically significant. Compare, for example, compensation at an undiversified, single-segment firm iDIVERSE = 0) to that at a same-size firm with two equal-sized business segments " Some previous work assigns each firm to a single industry, using the firm's primary SIC code. This procedure could misestimate the diversification premia if diversified firms weight compensation norms across all industries in which they operate. Reestimating our model with a single primary industry effect yields diversification coefficients slightly higher than those we report below. Note: All regressions include year and weighted industry fixed effects. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. iDTVERSE = .5). This difference in diversification, equal to ahout two standard deviations in DIVERSE, is estimated to raise SALARY hy ahout 12% (standard error of the estimate, 3%) and to raise TOTAL compensation hy 14% (standard error, 5%).'* At the sample means of SALARY and TOTAL compensation, this would correspond to increases of about $128,000 and $262,000, respectively. The point estimates of the DIVERSE coefficient generally are stahle, although they tend to increase slightly as we add more complete controls for firm financial performance: compare columns 1 and 2, or columns 5 and 6, when we add current accounting retum and lagged retum variables to the model. '* All calculations are based on the specifications reported in column 3 for SALARY and in column 6 for TOTAL, unless otherwise noted. Throughout the text, standard errors follow the coefficient estimates in parentheses.
The other coefficients reported in Tahle 3 are consistent with earlier studies and are largely unaffected hy the inclusion of diversification measures. The elasticity of compensation with respect to firm size, measured hy SALES, is about .26 (.02) for SALARY and .33 (.03) for TOTAL compensation. Including employees as an additional scale variable in column 4 adds little explanatory power and has no effect on the estimated diversification coefficient.'^ This suggests that the diversification premium is not due to simple differences in labor scale or intensity across diversified and undiversified firms. We have also experimented with specifications that allow for more nonlinearity in the size effect by allowing the coefficient on iniSALES) to change as SALES increases. This yielded an almost constant elasticity of .25 across all SALES ranges and no change in the coefficient on DIVERSE.
CEO pay varies directly with both accounting and market retums, and the estimated sensitivity of pay to firm performance is much larger once lags in performance are included, consistent with results in Joskow and Rose (1994) . Increasing market retum in the current year by 10 percentage points implies a 5AZA/?y increase of 1.2% (.5%) in the current year, 1.7% (.5%) in the next year, and 1.3% (.4%) in the third year. An increase of 10 percentage points in current accounting retum implies a 5.9% (1.7%) increase in current SALARY and 2.5% (1.2%) and .5% (1.3%) increases in the two subsequent years' SALARY. The estimated performance sensitivity is greater for TOTAL compensation, but the coefficient pattern is similar to that for SALARY.
The results indicate that compensation also increases with the variability of firm performance measures. Both SALARY and TOTAL compensation increase with the standard deviation of weekly market retums for the firm, SDRET. An increase in SDRET from four percentage points to five percentage points (one standard deviation increase from its sample mean) raises predicted SALARY by almost 5.5% (1.6%) and TOTAL by almost 7% (2.0%). This is consistent with a pay premium for CEOs who bear more compensation risk through greater variability in their performance-based compensation or through an increased probability of termination resulting from very low performance realizations. Because SDRET is negatively correlated with diversification, including SDRET increases slightly the estimated magnitude of the diversification effect.
Finally, compensation varies in expected ways with CEO characteristics. There are modest tenure effects, with each additional year of tenure as CEO increasing SALARY by .8% (.4%; column 3).'* These increments are in addition to the underlying upward trend in compensation over the late 1980s that is captured in the fixed year effects." Age at appointment has a small and statistically imprecise effect.^" Outside hires eam a 15% SALARY premium relative to intemal hires, and founders realize SALARY discounts of about 13% relative to nonfounders. The point estimates for the TOTAL compensation equation exhibit a similar pattern but tend to be somewhat larger in magnitude.
• Functional form and the diversification premium. The qualitative results for the diversification premium are robust to a variety of altemative measurements of diversification we have explored. Two variants are of particular interest. One decomposes " We have experimented with specifications replacing SALES with book assets and employees. The size elasticity of .25 divides between assets and employees in these equations, and the DIVERSE coefficient tends to be slightly smaller and noisier, though in general within one standard error of the results in Table 3 .
" We have explored specifications allowing the incremental tenure effect and the estimated diversification premia to differ over length of tenure. Our results for the diversification premia are robust to these variations.
" These are reported in Table A2 for the specifications in columns 3 and 6.^ This masks a divergence in the age effect between outside and intemal hires. Specifications that relax the assumption of similar slope coefficients across intemal and extemal hires suggest that CEOs promoted from within the firm are paid .9% (.2%) more for each additional year of age before becoming CEO, while CEOs hired from outside the firm are paid 1.9% (.5%) less for each additional year. DIVERSE into two terms: the first term increases (nonlinearly) in the number of segments in), the second decreases in the variance of segment size:
where CT^ is the variance of segment revenue shares in the firm. The (unreported) estimates for this decomposition suggest that the number component drives the diversification results: the coefficients on the (-1/«) terms are identical to those on DIVERSE itself, while those on the variance component are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This may imply that adding additional business segments increases the complexity of the management task even if the new activities are small relative to the primary line of business. A second variant relaxes the particular nonlinear functional form assumptions for the effects of number of segments on compensation imposed by DIVERSE and the (-l/n) decomposition. To allow for a general nonlinear relationship, we estimate separate premia, relative to compensation at undiversified single-segment firms, for each value of NUMSEG (two through ten segments). Because cell counts drop sharply with the number of segments (see Table 2 ), we also consider estimates that pool across similar NUMSEG categories. Table 4 reports the diversification premia by number of segments for three specifications. To facilitate comparison, column 1 records the SALARY diversification premia implied by the estimated coefficient on DIVERSE (from Table 3 , column 3).^' Column 2 reports the SALARY premium estimated when DIVERSE is replaced by a set of nine dummy variables, one for each value of NUMSEG from 2 through 10. Comparing these columns shows that the underlying nonlinearity differs from the form imposed by the construction of DIVERSE. Diversified firms appear to partition roughly into three categories: two-segment firms, three-through five-segment firms, and firms with six or more segments. These categories form the basis of the estimates reported in column 3. Columns 4 through 6 of Table 4 repeat this analysis for TOTAL compensation.
Moving from a single-segment to a two-segment firm adds 10% to SALARY. A further move into the three-to five-segment category adds an additional 6.5% premium relative to single-segment firms, but no incremental premium for increased segments within this category. CEOs of the most diversified firms (6 through 10 segments) eam an additional 13% premium, implying a SALARY that is 30% higher than the SALARY for CEOs of undiversified firms, all else equal. The TOTAL compensation estimates are both noisier and less stable. The point estimates suggest that the premium for adding a second segment to an undiversified firm is substantially larger than the corresponding premium for SALARY, at 19%. Predicted TOTAL compensation is relatively flat thereafter, increasing by an average of 2% for the third through fifth segments, and an additional 2% for moving to six or more segments. These results are substantially noisier than those for SALARY compensation, however, and point estimates for the total compensation diversification premium generally fall within a standard error of those in the SALARY regressions.
The results suggest that the distinction between diversified and undiversified enterprises is more significant than most distinctions within the class of diversified firms, with the possible exception of those few firms with highly diffuse operations (the 24 firms in our sample with six or more business segments). This pattern is consistent 
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.180 (.074) (6) . with a discrete jump in required managerial inputs when a firm changes from specialized (one-segment) to diversified. Although the form of the diversification-compensation relationship suggests that further research into how diversification affects the managerial task would be interesting, we are concerned here with assessing the effect of the functional form assumption on our results. The basic comparability of these general form estimates reported in Table 4 to those using DIVERSE suggests that the more parsimonious representations are sufficient to capture the basic nonlinearity of the relationship between compensation and diversification. In some of the subsequent analysis we will also exploit the fact that the resuhs using DIVERSE and i-VNUMSEG) are substantially the same.
Interpreting the diversification premium
•
The preceding results document the existence of substantial diversification premia. We now tum to interpreting these premia, focusing on two types of explanations: ability matching and managerial entrenchment.^^ While both are consistent^
We have explored whether "change in information" models might account for these premia. In these models (e.g., Aron, 1988; Hermalin and Katz, 1994) , operating in multiple lines of business may reduce information asymmetries between principals and CEOs. This could alter the incentive contract given the CEO, with ambiguous effects on compensation structure and level. The ambiguity in these models makes it difficult to test their applicability, but we find little empirical support for them in our data. We are unable to detect any significant differences between diversified and undiversified firms in the pay-for-performance relationship. Nor does allowing for different pay-for-performance slopes across diversified and undiversified firms affect our estimated diversification premia.
with the positive diversification premium observed in our panel of experienced CEOs, they differ in their predictions for the diversification premium for new and experienced CEOs and for the effect of changes in diversification by incumbent CEOs on their compensation. We discuss these two views and our approach to distinguishing them empirically below.
• Diversification and CEO ability. While there has been considerable debate over the value of diversification, there seems to be a consensus that managing a diversified firm well is a difficult task. Diversification may increase the complexity of the CEO's job (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989) ; at a minimum, it increases the complexity of the resource-allocation decision. Operating in more than one industry requires the CEO to understand several, potentially quite disparate, product markets. A CEO of a firm in multiple lines of business must evaluate competitive strategies for product lines that may have different customers, different industry structures, and different competitors. Managing diverse lines of business may require deploying a broad variety of resources and capabilities. Finally, realizing potential synergies across business segments involves facilitating coordination and communication across business groups within the firm (see Chandler, 1992) .
If the firm's marginal retum to executive talent increases with diversification, an efficient market for managerial talent will generate higher compensation at more diversified firms.^^ These equilibrium effects of diversification on compensation can be illustrated in a simple matching model, where managers with higher ability are matched with positions in which the marginal retum to ability is higher (Rosen, 1982; Waldman, 1984) . In these models, the top manager contributes to the productivity of all other workers, and more-able managers make a larger contribution than less-able managers. The marginal retum to ability realized by the firm is the increment to productivity caused by hiring a person of higher ability in a given position and is a characteristic of the firm. Characteristics that increase the marginal retum to ability in the position will have two equilibrium effects: the ability of those selected to fill the position will be greater, and the compensation associated with the position will be higher. In the existing models, this characteristic is firm size, but a similar argument can be made for diversification. This abihty-matching argument is consistent with the positive coefficient on diversification reported in Table 3 .
The ability-matching explanation also suggests that the diversification premium for new CEOs should be about the same as the diversification premium for more-experienced CEOs. In the simplest matching model, CEO ability is tenure-invariant, implying a constant diversification premium, ceteris paribus. In a more complete ability-matching model, CEOs might learn on the job, effectively increasing their ability to manage the firm, or there might be some leaming about the quality of the match so that retained CEOs are more-able CEOs. In these cases, ability, and hence compensation, might increase over incumbency. This is the rationale for including a control for CEO tenure in the compensation specification. Given that control, the ability-matching explanation predicts a tenure-invariant diversification premium: new CEOs should eam the same premium for managing a diversified firm as do experienced 3 In our discussion, we treat managerial talent as a vertically differentiated product for which ability rankings are well defined. But there may be differences in the kinds of skills involved in top-management jobs. Diversified firms, for example, may require more general managerial talent than the top position at single-segment firms, and industry-specific or firm-specific human capital may be more important for singlesegment firms. If the specificity of human capital at undiversified firms implies a lower outside option value for the incumbent CEO, we would also expect a premium for diversification. We are grateful to a referee and seminar participants for suggesting this altemative interpretation of CEO ability. ** If tenure effects differ between diversified and undiversified firms, imposing the same tenure slope
Matching models also imply that the diversification premium eamed by a CEO who diversifies the firm will be smaller than the premium eamed by his replacement who is hired because he is well matched to the new level of diversification. To be more precise, if CEO replacement were costless, these models imply that changes in diversification should lead the firm to replace the current CEO with one whose ability optimally matches the firm's new scope.^' Because CEO tumover is costly to both the firm and the CEO, there is likely to be value in retaining the incumbent CEO, as long as the mismatch is not too severe. This suggests that changes in diversification may lead to bargaining between the CEO and the firm, with both parties sharing the costs of the mismatch. As a result, the compensation of incumbent CEOs who have increased their firms' diversification should be less than the compensation that would be eamed by a new, higher-ability and optimally matched CEO. Similarly, the compensation eamed by incumbents who have reduced their firms' diversification should be higher than that of less-able but optimally matched CEOs. This suggests that the coefficient on changes in diversification in a first-difference regression will be smaller than the coefficient observed in the levels regressions in Table 3 .
o Diversification and management entrenchment. Agency models provide an altemative explanation of the relation between firm diversification and CEO compensation. A growing academic literature, as well as popular press accounts of top management in large public corporations, focuses on possible misalignments between shareholders' interests and the CEO's objectives. The primary mechanisms for ahgning incentives may not be sufficiently powerful or precise to prevent self-serving decisions that are good for managers but not for owners. Executive compensation schemes, it is argued, provide insufficient perfonnance incentives to make shareholder wealth maximization the top executive priority (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990 ). Boards of directors may have inadequate information and incentives to monitor and control CEO behavior (Mace, 1971) . The market for corporate control, which may discipline particularly egregious mismanagement, is at best an imperfect mechanism given the transactions costs incurred in its use.
Absent effective controls on executive behavior, CEOs may pursue a variety of objectives (including perhaps, increased diversification), regardless of whether they are consistent with shareholders' objectives. If CEOs can enforce self-serving decisions, there are a number of channels through which diversification and compensation might be linked. A common argument combines the empirical observation that compensation increases in firm size with an assertion that diversification may be the most effective way for a firm to grow. In particular, it is argued that diversification may be an attractive means to increase firm size when antitrust constraints restrict acquisitions within a firm's existing lines of business or intemal growth opportunities are poor. If corporate boards reward executives for firm size, CEOs may have an incentive to diversify even when it does not contribute to shareholder wealth. A similar argument has been made with respect to compensation risk: because diversification reduces the variance in the firm's market rate of retum, it may be preferred by risk-averse managers who have some share of their compensation tied to market retums or by CEOs whose boards could affect the comparison of relative diversification premia across new and experienced CEOs. Estimates that allow for differential tenure (leaming) effects fail to reject common tenure slopes, and they have no effect on the pattern of estimated diversification premia.
' Similarly, matching models that focus on the match between CEO and firm size predict that substantive changes in firm size should lead the firm to replace the CEO if it were not costly to do so. reward predictable performance (Amihud and Lev, 1981; May, 1995) . These explanations suggest that diversification changes the firm's size or risk profile, but they cannot explain a diversification premium in an empirical specification that controls for firm scale and risk.
A second entrenchment argument that is consistent with a positive empirical correlation between diversification and compensation in the cross-section, even after controlling for scale and risk, is the following: Suppose there is unobserved variation in entrenchment and that diversification is correlated with entrenchment. This could arise if, for example, CEOs who are more powerful vis-^-vis their boards are better able to implement their preferences, and these preferences include both greater compensation and diversification. The preference for greater compensation seems quite plausible. CEOs may prefer diversification as a means toward greater size (and therefore greater compensation), because of its effects on the variance in retums, or because it is a relatively easy way to affect the direction of the firm.^* This implies a positive crosssectional correlation between pay and diversification, consistent with the evidence in Table 3 .^^ It also might lead to a positive correlation between changes in diversification and changes in compensation for incumbent CEOs, both caused by unobserved variations in CEO entrenchment. If entrenchment increases with tenure, this argument also implies that diversification premia would be smaller for new CEOs than for experienced CEOs. Entrenchment and tenure are plausibly correlated: the longer a CEO has held her position, the more opportunity she has had to influence the composition of the board of directors and to build a constituency among managers within the firm.^* Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) offer a more sophisticated agency-based explanation of the diversification premium that is particularly interesting because it posits a direct connection between diversification and compensation. They argue that a CEO may attempt to increase his value to the firm by changing its business mix to one for which his managerial skills are uniquely well suited. In this variant of the standard ability-matching model, a CEO opportunistically creates a good match by diversifying the firm; this increases the value to the firm of his specific human capital, enabling the CEO to negotiate a higher wage with the board of directors.^^ Incumbent CEOs who diversify their firms will be rewarded with higher compensation if this is the dominant source of a diversification-compensation link.'" This suggests that changes in diversification and compensation should be positively correlated in a first-difference regression. If this effect is strong, it will tend to generate a positive correlation between '^ Some argued, for example, that GE's 1976 acquisition of a billion-dollar mining company arose from its CEO's desire to make a "lasting imprint on his firm" (Fortune, August 1977). Roll (1986) argues that acquisition decisions in general may be the result of CEO "hubris," a belief that they are uniquely well qualified to evaluate and/or manage the target firm.
" It is, of course, possible that a "moderately" entrenched CEO would be willing to trade off diversification for compensation if he values both. In that case, it is not clear what empirical pattern to expect.
2' Sample-selection biases also may induce a positive correlation between tenure and unobserved entrenchment, as, for example, if more-entrenched managers are able to stay in the CEO position longer than the average CEO. This would affect the diversification premium only if the selection bias were correlated with diversification. The shorter average tenure of CEOs at diversified firms (see Table 1 ) makes this less plausible.
The compensation increase will depend on the difference between the value to the firm of the incumbent CEO and the value of the next-best-qualified manager. This can be thought of as the rent value of the incumbent CEO's unique talents. This argument implicitly assumes that the CEO cannot seek employment with a firm already active in the areas to which he is uniquely well suited. Put differently, this model assumes that the labor market does not match firms and executive talent well. It also assumes that it is easier for the CEO to affect the scope of the firm in a manner harmful to stockholder interests than to change his compensation directly.
™ If the rent value of a CEO's human capital were maximized by specializing the firm, this model suggests that entrenched managers would reduce diversification. Since we want to consider explanations consistent with a diversification premium, we focus on rent increases generated by diversification. diversification and compensation for experienced CEOs (those who could have diversified their firms) in the levels equations, consistent with the panel results in Table 3 . Finally, this model suggests smaller diversification premia for new CEOs. A CEO may be able to alter the business mix over time to fit her unique abilities. But because a diversification program is likely to require some lead time, it is unlikely that a new CEO can alter the firm's business mix rapidly enough to affect the compensation she earns in her early years as CEO. Instead, the new CEO will be compensated based on her fit with the firm as shaped by the preceding CEO.'" Since the successor must be distinctly less well suited to that business mix for this strategy to raise the incumbent's compensation, her premium from diversification should be much smaller.
Empirical evidence on the interpretation of diversification premia
• We now tum to estimates of the diversification premium for new CEOs and to first-difference regressions of compensation changes on diversification changes to distinguish the competing explanations of the cross-sectional diversification premium.
• Compensation premia for new CEOs. As argued above, if the diversification premium is a retum to ability, it should be eamed by CEOs in their first and all subsequent years of office. A positive diversification premium for new CEOs is less plausibly explained by the effects of managerial entrenchment models.^T he last column of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 175 "new" CEOs, those we observe in their second year of office. We chose to work with second-year CEOs largely because Forbes data do not appear consistently to eliminate partial first years from the sample. For "inside CEOs," who previously may have held another top management position, reported compensation during their first year may include pay for other offices. For outside hires, reported first-year compensation may reflect signing bonuses or buy-outs of stock options or pension rights at their previous firm, or less than 12-month compensation. While the aggregate diversification premium for firstyear CEOs was comparable to those reported here, we have more confidence in the data for second-year CEOs.
As would be expected, the new CEOs eam less in SALARY and total compensation than do experienced CEOs. They also tend to be employed by slightly larger and more diversified firms than the average CEO in our experienced panel. This is consistent with shorter average tenure among diversified firms (compare columns 2 and 3 of Table  1 ), which implies overrepresentation of diversified firms in a new-CEO sample.
We focus in this sample on salary and bonus regressions. Because total compensation differs from salary and bonus primarily in its inclusion of the ex post value of exercised stock options, most substantial differences between total compensation and salary and bonus for new CEOs arise from options awarded in prior management positions. Table 5 reports estimates from three variants of the compensation equation for this sample of 175 CEOs. Column 1 reports results for the new-CEO analog to the specification of Table 3 , colunm 3." The coefficient on DIVERSE is basically identical ' We have estimated equations that take this statement literally, by replacing the current value of DIVERSE for new CEOs with its value during the last year of the preceding CEO's tenure. The coefficient on DIVERSE increases slightly with this substitution, providing even further support for ability interpretations.
32 We consider below the possibility that newly appointed CEOs may not be "new" from an entrenchment perspective, that is, that CEOs promoted from within the firm are part of its management "team" and therefore share such characteristics as entrenchment with the previous CEO.
3' The specification is based on column 3, Table 3 , with three exceptions. First, CEO tenure is a constant and is therefore omitted. Second, only current performance measures are used, since new CEOs have no Note: All regressions include year and weighted SIC fixed effects. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. "New" CEOs are defined as CEOs in their second year of tenure.
to the estimates for experienced CEOs, at .23, although the results are noisier for this smaller sample (standard error, .09). These results are quite consistent with the abilitypremium interpretation of the diversification effect. They provide no support for the entrenchment explanations based on managerial power that increases with tenure in position. Eurther, they are not consistent with a Shleifer-Vishny argument that depends on the top executive having had sufficient time to tailor the firm to match his abiUties.
We next investigate whether these results are contaminated by appointment of management "insiders" as the successor CEO. If entrenchment is a characteristic of the management team rather than of the CEO alone and the successor CEO is a member of the old team, similar premia for new and experienced CEOs might be consistent with an entrenchment view. In this case, the "new" CEO is not really new; she inherits the position and the entrenchment. If this inheritance effect is what drives the new-CEO results, the diversification premium should be higher for insider appointments than for CEOs brought in from outside the firm. If, on the other hand, the abihty model is correct, these premia should be roughly the same.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 , we report the results of specifications that relax the assumption of common parameters for "inside" and "outside" CEOs. Both specifications allow the basic compensation parameters to differ for outside CEOs. Specification 3 also allows the year fixed effects to differ for outside CEOs. Columns 2A and 3A report the coefficient of each variable for inside CEOs, while columns 2B and 3B give the incremental effect for outside hires. Note that the small number of outside prior performance by virtue of their newness. Third, founder and SDRET have been dropped. Their coefficients are quite noisy and typically small; including them in the model would raise the estimated diversification premium by about .02.
hires limits the precision of these estimates.^" The data nevertheless provide httle support for entrenchment-based explanations of the diversification premium. While the results are quite noisy, the point estimates suggest that the new-CEO diversification premium is, if different, likely to be smaller rather than larger for CEOs drawn from current management.
o Changes in diversification and the compensation premium. We next test the argument that entrenched CEOs diversify as a means to increased compensation, by examining the effect of changes in diversification on changes in compensation. We begin by assessing the direct effect of diversification on compensation: can a CEO increase her compensation by changing only the level of diversification? This is the heart of the Shleifer-Vishny argument that CEOs attempt to increase their compensation by tailoring the firm to fit their abilities. In this model, increasing diversification should increase compensation, ceteris paribus. Ability models, in contrast, predict that any increase in compensation eamed by an incumbent from diversifying will be, ceteris paribus, less than the cross-sectional premium for the same change in diversification.
To test these competing hypotheses, we estimate our basic compensation model in first differences. We have the data necessary for a first-difference specification for 997 CEO-years of the 1,493 CEO-years in our experienced-CEO panel.^' Table 6 reports summary statistics for the variables included in the first-differenced model. These include changes in compensation, DIVERSE, IniSALES), and the rate of retum measures. The remaining variables in the levels equation are either literally or nearly constant for a CEO over time and therefore are excluded from the first-difference equations.'*" The sample divides fairly evenly among increases, decreases, and no changes in DIVERSE. While most of the changes in DIVERSE are due to movements in segment shares rather than changes in the number of segments, the 146 observations with changes in the reported number of segments account for more than 80% of the total variation in DIVERSE.
Results for the first-differenced models are reported in Table 7 , using both changes in DIVERSE and changes in -l/NUMSEG as our measures of diversification. The estimated compensation effect of increasing DIVERSE is negative and relatively substantial for both salary and bonus and total compensation. This suggests that the boards rewarded specialization and penalized diversification during our sample period. The estimates imply that splitting an undiversified firm into two equal-size business segments (an increase from 0 to .5 in DIVERSE or in -l/NUMSEG) without changing the overall size of the firm would reduce SALARY by 6.5% (3.2%; column 2) to 8% (4.3%; column 1) and reduce TOTAL compensation by 15% (9%; colunm 4) to 17% (11.3%; column 3). The point estimates are somewhat noisy but can be bounded from zero at the .05 confidence level for the SALARY regressions and at the .09 to .13 level in the TOTAL regressions. Even a moderately conservative interpretation of these estimates rejects the interpretation that increasing diversification is an effective means to increased compensation, holding all else constant. ' •* There are only 27 outside hires, only 7 of which are in undiversified firms.
' Estimated compensation-level equations for this subsample are quite similar to those for the full 1,493-observation dataset, reported in Table 3 . The coefficient on DIVERSE is slightly larger for the 997-observation subsample, at .28 (standard error, .07) for SALARY and .32 (.11) for TOTAL compensation, but within one standard error of the results reported in Table 3 , columns 3 and 6. '* The model includes year effects but not weighted industry effects. Including changes in the weighted industry fixed effects in the model does not affect the qualitative results but substantially increases the noisiness of the estimates. The differenced data do not appear to have sufficient power to estimate industry effects as well as the reported coefficients. Note: All regressions include year fixed effects. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses.
We have explored whether the negative diversification coefficient in these regressions was due either to failures of compensation to respond to size changes when both diversification and size change, or to greater rewards for CEOs who focus the firm but no penalties for those who diversify. Specifications modifying those reported in Table  7 to allow both the AlniSALES) and ABIVERSE coefficients to depend on whether diversification has increased, decreased, or remained constant suggest no asymmetries in the diversification coefficients. The data do not reject pooling to a single DIVERSE coefficient in any of the regressions reported in Table 7 .
Altemative entrenchment arguments suggest that diversification may be pursued not to raise compensation directly, as in Shleifer and Vishny, but for its indirect effect on compensation through increased firm size. Following these arguments, diversification would be most attractive to firms with poor growth prospects in their primary business, for example, or where antitrust constraints preclude substantial growth in the firm's primary business. The negative DIVERSE coefficient tells us that disproportionately high growth in the firm's primary business (which reduces DIVERSE) is rewarded more than disproportionately high growth in secondary businesses (which increases DIVERSE). Given a choice, then, an entrenched CEO should prefer to expand the firm without increasing its diversification. If this option is not in the choice set, however, growth might be purchased through diversification. To address this argument, we ask three questions. First, do firms that diversify during our sample period appear to be growth-limited firms? Second, is the sales change that accompanies diversification typically sufficient to more than offset the diversification penalty we estimate? Third, does the CEO eam more having diversified than she would have eamed had she not changed the scope of the firm?
We can provide only limited evidence on the first question, as our sample is not constructed with this specific objective in mind.'^ We divide the firms in our firstdifferenced sample into three categories: those that increase the number of reported segments ("diversify") during our observation period, those that reduce the number of reported segments ("focus") during this period, and those with no change in the reported number of segments ("control"). For each of these firms, we measure their annual change in sales for each year prior to their first reported change in diversification. For the last group, this implies using all sales changes. There are 61 "focusing" and 45 "diversifying" firms for which we have one or more prior years of sales-change data. There are 218 firms in the group with no change in diversification. Our data provide no support for the view that diversifying firms have limited growth prior to their diversification. Both the diversifying and focusing groups have slightly higher mean SALES growth than the control group, each with 8.3% compared to 7.9% for the control group, but none of the differences even approach statistical significance. These comparisons do not change when we control for year effects in sales changes. By this simple metric, at least, this sample provides no support for the notion that diversification is motivated by historically poor growth.
The second question is whether sales growth that accompanies diversification is sufficient to offset the diversification penalty and raise compensation. The most conservative of the first-differenced results (colunm 2 of Table 7) suggests that adding a second segment to an undiversified firm must increase overall sales by 37% to preserve an unchanged level of salary and bonus. Required sales increases are more modest when considering further diversification of already-diversified firms, reflecting the nonlinearity in the diversification discount. For example, adding a third segment to a two-segment firm will leave salary and bonus unchanged if total sales increase by 11%; adding a fifth segment to a four-segment firm requires only a 3% increase in overall sales to keep salary and bonus constant. The observed changes that accompany changes in diversification in our sample on average do no more than offset the direct effect of changes in diversification. The expected net effect of changes in sales and increases in diversification is to increase SAIARY by .2% (standard deviation, 5.9%). Focusing the firm gains the CEO only slightly more: the expected net effect of changes in sales and decreased diversification is to raise SALARY by 2.3% (standard deviation 5.9%). Half of the increases in diversification are accompanied by sales increases sufficient to offset the diversification discount to compensation; less than a third of the decreases in diversification are accompanied by sales reductions sufficient to offset the "focus" premium.'* But even for the group of CEOs with offsetting sales increases, the expected net effect of increased diversification and sales on compensation is modest, averaging 4% more in salary and bonus and 5.7% more in total compensation.
Finally, we ask whether the net effect of diversification is to leave the CEO with greater compensation than she would have had in the absence of diversification. This moves beyond the calculations used to answer the second question by framing the question in terms of the CEO's counterfactual compensation. That is, what would the CEO's compensation change have been if the firm had not been diversified? The selection of a particular counterfactual is somewhat arbitrary: we make the assumption that the CEO could have realized the firm's "normal" rate of SALES growth in the absence of any diversification. We therefore will compare the predicted change in compensation from changing the number of segments and realizing the observed change in sales to the predicted change in compensation from holding the number of segments constant and realizing the previous year's change in sales. Table 8 reports the means of the predicted compensation changes for these two comparisons.'' For both compensation measures, CEOs who diversify their firm could have expected greater compensation growth had they held diversification and sales growth constant at the previous year's levels. This difference is large (5%) and statistically significant for TOTAL compensation. CEOs who focus their firms do somewhat better than they would have by continuing with the previous year's level of diversification and sales growth; the difference again is largest (3%) and statistically significant only for TOTAL compensation. These calculations provide no support for the argument that diversification can be used as an indirect means to increased compensation, at least for our sample of late-1980s CEOs.
Overall, the first-difference results are difficult to reconcile with managerial entrenchment explanations of diversification. In contrast to the predictions of the Shleifer and Vishny model, there is no premium to the CEO from "tailoring" the firm to fit the CEO. Changing the mix of the firm, ceteris paribus, reduces rather than increases the CEO's compensation. Further, there is no support for the claim that the CEO is indirectly better off because the higher growth associated with diversification offsets the diversification penalty. We cannot rule out the possibility that diversification is pursued because CEOs have a preference for managing conglomerate enterprises, but the results suggest that indulging such a taste may be costly for the CEO.
3* Based on the -l/NUMSEG regressions reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 . 3' The predictions are based on first-difference regressions using the specifications in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 . The regressions are estimated on 725 observations, which is the number of observations in our 997 sample for which we observe lagged changes in \n{SALES). While these data are difficult to reconcile with an entrenchment view of the compensation-diversification relationship, they are consistent with the predictions of the ability-matching model. In these models, the compensation increase associated with an increase in diversification initiated by an incumbent will be less than the cross-sectional difference in compensation for optimally matched CEOs. The argument, again, is that the cross-sectional difference reflects the payment to optimally matched CEOs, while the first-difference reward to diversification includes a penalty for a less-than-optimal match. Consider a single-segment firm that adds a second segment of equal size, increasing DIVERSE by .50 and \n{SALES) by .69. The coefficients in column 1 of Table  7 imply a SALARY increment of 7%. To think about the analogous cross-sectional difference for optimally matched CEOs, we use the coefficients for new CEOs. The coefficients in column 1 of Table 5 imply that a new CEO at a two-segment firm will eam 31% more than a new CEO at a single-segment firm that is half as large."*" This is the pattern we would expect if ability matching is the dominant source of the diversification premium.
The negative correlation between changes in diversification and executive compensation is also consistent with market preferences for industrial focus or specialization over our sample period. Recent empirical research suggests that greater diversification was on average associated with reduced shareholder wealth during the late 1980s. Studies have concluded that diversified firms tend to be less profitable than comparable undiversified firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Montgomery and Wemerfelt, 1988) and that the stock market reacts less favorably to diversifying acquisitions than to acquisitions of business closely related to the firm's existing line of business (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990) .'" If executive compensation includes a component that rewards improvements to and penalizes degradation of firm performance beyond the response to changes in accounting or market retums, pay might adjust to reflect the •"" Similar calculations can be made for the reverse move: focusing the firm. A CEO who sells one of two equal-sized business segments reduces DIVERSE by .5 and \n(SALES) by .69. The results in Table 7 imply that the incumbent CEO's salary would fall by 7%. The results for new CEOs in Table 5 imply a decline of 24%.
•" These findings depend on the time period analyzed. Empirical research suggests that stock market reaction to diversifying acquisitions and measured firm performance subsequent to diversification tend to be more favorable during the 1960s (e.g., Matsusaka, 1993) and most negative during the 1980s (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990 ). expected outcomes of adding or subtracting diverse lines of business. This would imply a compensation penalty to increased diversification, as observed in Table 6 . This result echoes Lambert and Larcker (1987) , who find that CEOs can increase their compensation through acquisitions only if the acquisitions increase the shareholder value of the acquiring firm.
Conclusions
• During the late 1980s, firm diversification appears to have been associated with significantly higher compensation for the chief executive. CEOs of firms with two distinct lines of business eam on average 12% to 14% more than do CEOs of similar but undiversified firms. This corresponds to an additional $128,000 relative to the mean salary and bonus for our sample of top CEOs. Moreover, the effect of diversification on compensation is as strong for new CEOs as it is for experienced CEOs, those with an average tenure of 11 years in office. This suggests that the diversification premium is a characteristic of the job and its demands and not a result of changes instituted by incumbent managers to increase their value to the firm or to pursue their own agendas.
For a given CEO, increases in diversification during our sample period, holding all else constant, appear to reduce rather than increase compensation. This appears inconsistent with the notion of CEOs undertaking diversification to increase their compensation. While it is difficult to falsify the hypothesis that CEOs diversify because they have a taste for diversification, indulging this taste may be costly for the CEO. The change regressions suggest that the average CEO has insufficient control to diversify her corporation without paying a price in forgone compensation compared to what she could have earned by maintaining the status quo.
Our findings support an interpretation of diversification premia as rents earned by high-ability CEOs. If diversification increases the marginal return to ability, and an efficient labor market allocates higher-ability CEOs to more-diversified firms, CEOs at more-diversified firms will eam higher compensation. This is consistent with the premium observed for experienced CEOs and the equally high premium for new CEOs. The lower increments to changes in diversification for incumbent CEOs are also consistent with matching models with tumover costs. Because tumover is costly for both the firm and the incumbent chief executive, bargaining produces an increment that is smaller than would be observed if the salaries of two well-matched CEOs were compared.
The evidence presented in this article does not directly bear on the broader question of whether diversification adds or destroys value on average. The prevailing view in the economics literature appears to be that diversification-at least as practiced in the 1980s-was not value creating. Indeed, the entrenchment arguments summarized here derive much of their force from a strong prior that the diversification is not good for stockholders. If stockholders do not benefit (or even lose) from diversification, the question of why firms are diversified naturally arises. The agency literature supplies an easy answer to this question: diversification benefits the top managers who make the diversification decision. The evidence in this article suggests that this answer may be too easy and that further research into reasons for diversification is warranted.
One approach to this problem (Matsusaka, 1995) treats diversification as a transition strategy pursued by firms that have exhausted opportunities in the original line of business and are searching for a good match with existing resources. Once the match is found, the firm will refocus in the new line of business. Testing dynamic theories of this sort will require a many-year panel with careful attention to the ongoing identity of the firm. A second line of research is suggested by strategic management scholars who view the firm as a collection of resources and capabilities rather than as a collection of products (Penrose (1959) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) , for example). If this view of the firm is taken seriously, the existing measures of diversification based on product scope are inadequate, and further empirical work will need to develop some more appropriate metric for diversification. 
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